HALDANE"S MACKINDERGARTEN : A RADICAL EXPERIMENT IN BRITISH MILITARY EDUCATION?
The name of Sir Halford Mackinder(1861-1947) today is associated with a form of theorising about international relations called Geopolitics 1 . It can be described as an attempt to apply synthesis to geography, history and international politics. He developed "outlook"which had three important qualities: an ability to interpret the past; to visualize the present ; and to imagine the future. Despite this formidable intellectual legacy some geographers, who are advocates of critical geopolitics, have wrongly interpreted both Mackinder and his ideas 2 as being simply the handmaiden of going -but I have certainly gathered no moss". 4 The aim of this article is to evaluate a dimension of this polymath career that has to date received only sparse and intermittent attention. Furthermore, it will be shown that it has been obscured by a combination of vague and inaccurate information. This lack of facts has been fused with an interpretation that has had the effect of distancing one of Mackinder"s There were also a small number of officers from the Indian Army. A brief analysis of the composition of the course will be given later.
To evaluate this course a four-fold approach will be taken. First, there is a need to establish the historical facts. Secondly, the unique circumstances in which the course was conceived, and the wider political and social ideas in which it was embedded, will be explained. This will also entail assessing the personal relationships that
Mackinder was able to draw upon to make the course the success that it was. Thirdly, to address the question about the radical nature of the "Mackindergarten", it is important to identify the generic qualities of military education. This will be done by posing the following questions: What are the causes of innovation in military education? .Why in Britain was its development and progress erratic, and its utility Finally, an evaluation of the success achieved in sustaining the course"s aims, and as far as the available evidence will allow, the effectiveness of the knowledge transfer to the tactical and operational military environment will be undertaken The syllabus and exam questions of the geographical part of the course will be used to provide a means to assess the radical nature of Mackinder"s course. Finally, an evaluation will be made concerning the reasons for the demise of the course.
In terms of the historical facts, the path is littered with inaccurate and vague information .One of Mackinder"s two biographers, Parker, maintains that the course ran for seven years and was for senior officers only : "In 1906 Mackinder was asked by Haldane ,now Secretary of State for War, to organise at the LSE, a course for senior army officers-which came to be known as "Haldane"s Mackindergarten"; it was held annually until 1914". 6 In fact the bulk of the officers attending were captains and majors with a few colonels. The student cohort of this course could not be described as senior officers. Mackinder"s other biographer, Blouet, while identifying the parentage of the course and the date of commencement accurately, is vague as to when it was ended.: "Haldane (Minister of War) and Mackinder worked out a scheme to give Army officers administrative training. The first groups of officers entered the School in January 1907and completed a six month course in which they were exposed to accounting, law, economic theory, geography, statistics ,and transport studies. The program was a success and continued for many years." 7 It is only in the official history of the LSE that accurate historical facts are given in terms of the longevity of the course .What is curious about this account is that Dahrendorf attempts to distance the LSE from the course completely, and Mackinder"s role is not commented upon or assessed: " Strictly speaking it was not the School that made the experiment but War, produced a memorandum which set out the rudimentary ideas upon which the regular and auxiliary forces of the army were to be organised in future A second memorandum was produced on 1 February. However, the first memorandum outlined the policy objectives that underlined a need for the course that Mackinder was to develop: "In the first memorandum, Haldane specified the principles which would underpin the reform of the regular army. He contended that the army would have to differ from that of any other nation in order to meet its unique, long distance, overseas commitments. He affirmed that the country needed a highly organised and wellequipped striking force which can be transported, with the least possible delay, to any part of the world where it is required" 14 .
There is no doubt that this was an ambitious objective. To project and sustain military power at a distance without an established basing structure presented a serious challenge for Haldane"s policy objectives. One of the solutions he adopted could be described as a "continental solution" as it took its inspiration from European armies. Parliamentary debates and a flood of correspondence and memoranda testify that the concern for an improvement in military education -particularly of the staff -on the part of politicians and soldiers was both deep and widespread." greatly modified ,we may be permitted to believe that a system which accustoms officers and men to constant modifications of formations, compels them to use their own judgement, and brings peace-training and battle-practice into line is a thoroughly sound one". and the Lords of the Admiralty were in fact two boards of business directors, the difference between the two being that the army transacted its business in India and throughout the empire. Thus the geographical scope over which it has to operate was greater than the Royal Navy. However, Mackinder had carefully qualified this point and made a series of nuanced observations that recognised a difference of function and principle, but interestingly a similarity in methods, as far as military administration was concerned: "The Army is undoubtedly the greatest single business concern in the country. It is true of course that it is necessarily conducted on a different principle from ordinary city business. The Army is not conducted for profit, but to produce power. This power is used in peace time in order to maintain peace and in war time to achieve victory. But although this distinction of profit and power is a real one, yet I do not think that it makes a very vital difference as regards methods.
Your aim in the Army must be to produce the necessary amount of power at the least possible cost, and one of the main elements in a city business tending to produce profits is the saving of working expenses".
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The second of Mackinder"s special ideas, was one with which he was closely identified with in a political sense -efficiency 43 .As far as the Army was concerned, he argued that the idea had to rest on the twin pillars of knowledge and imagination.
In turn these two concepts were used to link the course to one of the core functions of strategy, identifying the most suitable means to achieve your objectives: "A great artist, who with a few strokes produces a telling portrait, is characterised by the two powers of being able to see the truth, and then of being able to reproduce it with economy of effort.. The same is true in the realm of strategy .What you admire in the achievement of the General in the field is the power of seeing the situation ,so far as it is discernible in the fog of war, and then the power of changing that situation by the idea of the Army as being like a business in certain methods and procedures :"Your great business man is as truly an artist as the great painter, or the great general. He has learned by apprenticeship to see the truth, and also by experience to accomplish his objects by simple means. The result is that he acts apparently without effort .The same is true of the business of war. And in this connection I venture to remind you that Lord Kitchener owes much of his success to the fact that in addition to all his qualities he was an economical administrator during the Sudanese Campaigns." 46 Despite this lucid articulation of his "special ideas" Mackinder"s course had been subject to criticisms of various kinds. He found himself having to deal with one of the perennial challenges of military education: a contested utility. Furthermore, he had to respond to this criticism while conceding that the Mackindergarten was an "experiment"
47 . He dealt with two categories of attack: "The first is that by far the best plan would be to take civilians experienced in business and to set them to administer the army, leaving the officers to do the fighting .In reply to this I am prepared to say that all history shows that the interference of civilians in military operations has not proved a success…….The other group of objectors urged that army officers should be sent for a period into a city office, there to serve as dignified office boys." 48 The experimental nature of the Army Class and the evolving nature of its syllabus were acknowledged in the initial War Office communiqué of December 1906: "The course which is now about to be inaugurated must be regarded as more or less experimental ,and the syllabus of instruction will be amended and modified as hereafter may be found expedient."
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Mackinder approached the challenge represented by these two approaches by embracing synthesis. The method was for army officers to understand the perspectives of business men. He qualified this by saying that these methods had to be interpreted and utilised in a particular way: "What you have to form is another special kind of business man, the soldier. I repeat therefore that it will be our object to teach those business methods which have been approved by long and general experience ,and to leave you to appropriate so much of them as fits with our own business of soldier." 50 Did Mackinder"s "special ideas" did mark the inception of a radical experiment in British military education? This question can only be evaluated by an examination of two issues: the Geography syllabus as it evolved between 1907 and 1932;and the army"s view of the course as a whole over the same period. Mackinder in his opening address acknowledged that the syllabuses were tentative and not yet complete. He also underlined the fact that the course"s development was going to be something of a departure for the LSE in that it would require a partnership between the academic staff and the army officers on the course before the syllabus could be finally fixed.
Mackinder acknowledged the nature of the problem and the pathway to a solution: "Given the lecturers with their specialised knowledge of the several subjects, what portions of those subjects will be of the most use to you.? It can only be by practice and experience that we can find what those portions are. There are two principles of selection which must be borne in mind. In the first place we must consider the direct utility to the soldier of the information given, and in the second place we must consider the general principles underlying it." geography has been included at the special request of the business men on the Consultative Committee. The object of economic geography is to enable the business man or the administrator in the clearest and most certain manner to grasp in his own mind and to convey to others the resources and conditions of a country resulting from its geography. We must learn to think geographically if in writing a report ,let us say, on the supplies and communications of a given region, we should make sure that our enquiry is exhaustive and that our statements are in perspective. In these days of world-wide communications and world prices you cannot think of any region in proper perspective unless you have the rest of the world in the back of your mind." 52 .
He then went onto to outline the intellectual challenge the course faced, and which linked back to one of the "special ideas" of the course -efficiency : "We are really dealing with a great synthetic problem, and our object in the six months before us will
be that all your studies should contribute to a single end, and that you should go back to your duties feeling that you have definitely acquired valuable knowledge ,increased breadth of outlook, and therefore increased power of efficiency". 53 Apart from the formal aspect of the syllabus Mackinder outlined the intention to set up what he called "smoking meetings". These were intended to take place once a week in the evening after dinner. The guest speakers would be business men. The purpose of these talks was stated in the following way: "Thus we will accumulate the experience of practical men" 54 .
The manner in which these radical ideas were sustained can be evaluated in a fourfold approach that has been previously outlined. having been a success, and the syllabus effective, but some adjustments would be made: "In conclusion we desire to say that we are convinced that the results which have been achieved by this first class fully warrant the continuance of this experiment.
The experience which has now been gained does not make it necessary to reorganize the scheme in any essential respects." 57 In terms of the numbers and background of the officers, the first course contained 31 students, and the largest contingent consisted of twelve from the Army Service Corps 58 .
The first Advisory Board report also confirmed that the challenge of pedagogy had been successfully addressed : "It is to be noted that many of the questions (on the One element had what could be described as a regional study. The second element was an interpretation of geography as a theatre of military operations. When this perspective is utilised certain important changes take place. Geography becomes more abstract and simplified in terms of the way that it is interpreted. Furthermore, the military strategist or commander will perceive only those geographical features that are relevant to the military objectives that he is attempting to achieve. This view of geography has a long lineage that goes back to antiquity. 60 The region that was selected was India. At the beginning of the twentieth century this was of vital geostrategic importance for Britain.: "The course will be divided into two parts. The first part will be devoted to a careful study of India. As an example of the methods of inquiry into the resources and conditions of a region of the world.". 61 The other five parts of the course were presented in a similar manner 62 .
The second element of the geography course was intended to "deal more generally with the geographical circumstances of those states with which this country is most likely to be concerned either as an opponent or an ally". One of the questions that Mackinder set for this first Army class was embedded in this perspective :"Britain is at war with a naval power which has succeeded in throwing a certain force into the West of Ireland, and has raised a great rebellion in that country.
The fighting at sea has been indecisive, and the enemy is getting ships through with arms and ammunition for the rebels. This ability to frame exam questions that had a real prescience was not restricted to regard as first class those reports in which the authors show a capacity to for using scientific geography as a framework for the setting of practical details….the value and necessity of this method increases in regions where detailed information is scanty or lacking" 70 .
In the second course which ran from October 1907 to March 1908 ,Geography was subject to a series of changes. The most important was that while Geography was still part of the syllabus, the course requirements were reduced. What were the reasons for this change? The answer was provided by Mackinder in the second Advisory Board report.
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:"I felt that it was necessary somewhat to reduce the range of instruction, and with that object we did not on this occasion repeat the experiment of requiring a geographical report from each member of the class. It will be remembered that stress was laid on Geography in the first place at the special request of the Advisory Board , but I felt all along that it was at more pertinent to the study of Strategy than to that of Administration. A little of it, however, presenting aspects unfamiliar to those whose ideas of geography are based on the school lessons of a few years ago, appeared desirable"
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In addition, to this there was no longer a final examination. No Geography paper was included in Appendix C of the Advisory Board report which reproduced all the papers. 73 The other important change that took place with respect to the Geography syllabus was a change of emphasis in terms of area. The regional study of India was replaced by one that had Britain as its focus The second element of the course remained unchanged, as did the overall teaching objectives that applied to both parts.
Mackinder focussed on an interpretation of Geography as a theatre of military operations: "Special regard will be had to such physical facts and human activities as One of the qualities that gave this course its dynamic quality was the ability of the lecturers and the Advisory Board to sustain a focus on the great unifying themes. The army continued to be pleased with the results that the course was producing. In the report that was submitted in May 1911 to Haldane the following comment was made: "We have much pleasure in reporting that the work of the class has been highly satisfactory .The class resembled last year"s in that it was a very level one, and, if anything, this characteristic was more accentuated this year. The class has worked well and all the officers have endeavoured to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the subjects". 83 There was a recognition that one of the qualities that the army considered important to the development of its officers was a breadth of outlook, despite the professional focus: "In the search for immediate and tangible results it should not be forgotten that the principal object ,which we have in view, is the acquirement by the officers of a good general knowledge of the subjects dealt with."
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In the last three Army courses that ran from October 1911 to March 1914.there are both continuities and discontinuities. In terms of overall numbers the course remains stable, with 31,31 and 32 for these last pre-First World War years. However, the number of Army Service Corps officers dropped below 50 % of the course with 8, 7, and 10 respectively over the same period. The Army continued to be pleased with the results of the course, and was intent on raising the standard that was expected in the final exams: "We are glad to report that the class has again been a very satisfactory one, all the officers working hard and taking a great interest in the subjects.
Alterations were made this time in the character of the examination in some of the subjects , which had the effect of making the test more severe. The officers, however, all acquitted themselves with credit." This relationship between the level of the overall state grant, and the cost of the Mackindergarten to the War Office was articulated clearly: "When the subject was last discussed with the school the Government Grant was £2,000 a year. It is now £16,000 and this contribution to the general expenses of the school is a handsome and adequate subscription to overhead charges. The London County Council, I believe, in return for their subsidy ,require a certain number of free places."
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The second argument deployed by the Treasury was much more direct .When they did a comparative analysis of the syllabus for the School of Military Administration and the Mackindergarten at the LSE they came to the following conclusion: "It is clear from this that theoretical instruction of the type proposed in the revived courses formed quite a small part of the curriculum at the SMA……The case for the proposal rests therefore, solely on the pre-war arguments The Treasury was always very sceptical a to the direct value of these courses to the army".
93 Furthermore, in the same memorandum the need for financial austerity was fused with an assertion of a lack of utility. The Treasury failed to comprehend or acknowledge the ability of this course-to facilitate and increase in the army"s power of efficiency.:"It is on the departmental services that we think the present Army establishment shows signs of extravagance; they have not been brought down below pre-war level. In spite of the substantial reductions in combatant arms ….With these reductions due, it is not time to invent or revive schemes for giving officers, particularly fairly senior officers ,employment of a non-essential nature." The final argument used by the Treasury contained a curious paradox. On one hand they appeared to be disparaging of the utility of the course, yet at the same time they acknowledged that resistance to its reinstatement was of no real financial importance :"I doubt whether so many officers have any real interest or enthusiasm for the subjects taught at the School. In as far as they that have not, a course of six months taken between the ages of 30 and 40 is not likely to have any lasting influence, nor to give value for the money spent. I have not drafted on the proposal, as there will undoubtedly be very strong pressure, both from the War Office and from the Authorities at the School of Economics to force this scheme through ,and it may be considered that our chance of opposing it is not sufficient to make it worth while".
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The final push was provided by William Beveridge who had contacted the War office at the end of June 1924, and informed them that as the term was coming to an end he needed to make provision for this course in terms of staffing. This resulted in a letter being send to the Treasury. 96 The outcome was that a decision was taken to formally approve future funding for the course. College method of instruction in which students were divided into syndicates after the first three months of the course, the aim being to give them a problem to work out and to require them to present a joint report outlining the solution. The response was instructive: "Sir William Beveridge replied that he was sympathetic to the idea of promoting discussions at the expense of lectures and had this already in mind, but he doubted whether syndicate methods lent themselves particularly to this course since the students had no preliminary knowledge of the subjects of which it consisted."
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This debate over teaching pedagogy has an echo today with respect to the United Kingdom"s Defence Academy. 101 What was also instructive about this meeting was the manner in which the Standing Advisory Committee, which had replaced the preFirst World War Advisory Board, took an active role in the shaping the syllabus of the course:"The students should be encouraged to take a more active part in handling the 101 Since the inception of the Joint Services Command and Staff College in 1997, there has been a consistent failure with respect to teaching pedagogy .Syndicates form a core element of the main staff course. They are tasked to cover an impossibly wide syllabus. The result is that it is done in a superficial manner. These syndicates are taught by a combination of the military directing staff and academic lecturers The students who are posted to the Defence Academy have little or no prior knowledge of the subjects they are asked to study. This educationally flawed approach is still in place today.. 106 There was also to be a corresponding reduction in the money the LSE would receive.
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This reduction itself, while not fatal to Mackindergarten, made it vulnerable to further Treasury attacks. In a letter dated 21 st December 1926 approval for a course to start in Jan 1927 was given. There was a caveat attached in terms of funding ,and the problems that the army had encountered in terms of the availability of officers was used as a weapon to question the future viability of the course: "My Lords limit their approval to a period of one year as they as not satisfied that as many as twenty officers likely to obtain direct benefit from the courses in respect to their Army career will continue to be available annually . 107 The LSE would now be paid £1,750 for a course of up to 20 twenty students This was in lieu of a sum of £1000 per course plus a fee of £40 per student.
view particular of the number of officers who have already passed through them since their reinstitution in 1924."
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The army"s response to this was a robust defence of both the value of the course and the numbers of officers that were attending the LSE.:"The courses are of great value to the Army as a whole and while the Council fully appreciate the need for economy, they do not consider that any reduction in the size of the course should be made". simultaneously make access to it more selective, and to cut the number of officers on the course: "After careful consideration they are satisfied that the Army as a whole has derived great benefit from these courses and they are strongly of the opinion that they should be continued .At the same time ,in view of other pressing demands on the funds at their disposal, they propose to exercise an even more rigid standard of selection ,and to limit future courses to 16 officers (including 4 or 5 Indian Army officers) at a fee of 100 guineas for each officer". It is rather the customs and methods of different kinds of businesses which will prove useful to the Army Service Corps officer in time of war. It must be remembered that the first and most important function of the supply officer in war is "food-finding", and to be a finder of food it is invaluable to him to know the trade customs of the dealers in the commodities he has had to find." 121 He also evaluated the teaching of School of Economics could teach us "the spirit of the hive". But before we learn to think collectively we must learn to think at all, and of all the subjects which helped us to new ideas, I think the most officers would agree with me that this subject gave us more to think more furiously than all the rest put together." 122 His views of the lectures on Geography were mixed. He acknowledged the importance of this part of the course: "There is no need to emphasize the value of this information to the senior supply officers of our Army" 123 .Yet there can be discerned an oblique criticism of the emphasis in these lectures, now given by Mackinder : "I thought that, perhaps, these lectures were too much strategical and too little commercial …….The lecturer attempted to apply his wonderful geographical knowledge to the conduct of a campaign and to plans of attack, subjects more suited, in my opinion to a training for the General Staff then for the QMG branch-but perhaps this is only the bias of the supply officer. Anyhow, all students at the School of Economics will agree with me that when the lecturer led us to the "brink of an imaginary plateau "we seemed to see knowledge that could be adapted for the purposes of military logistics. This approach had been one of the "special ideas" of Mackinder"s course:"In 1915 also, the BEF struck on its most successful innovation in administration when it began tapping civilian expertise and using them at essentially the same jobs that they had done in Britain." 131 Civilian experts such as Sir Eric Geddes were recruited helped to change the military transportation system that existed in France. 132 This in turn vastly improved the logistical structure and underpinned doctrinal development and ultimately operational effectiveness. 133 The innovation did clash with the vested interests of the officer corps of the army in terms of promotion and authority:"Business-organisers were therefore essential in the search for managerial improvements because of their honest portrayal of problems and the ability to recommend organisational solutions." presented at the time as the source of inspiration, but the British Army of the early nineteenth century. 135 The Mackindergarten can also be situated within the broad context of the post-1906 army reforms: "The Haldane reforms had sought to prepare officers for their duties by providing them with a mixture of education and training". 136 The Army Class at the LSE was able to sustain its original radical core throughout the entire period of its existence. This point has been made previously ,but when it is compared with the fate of other officer training and education courses that were developed in the same period the contrast is striking: "Whatever the objectives of the Haldane reforms, the staff at the cadet colleges who put them into practice insisted that conformity came before intellectual curiosity. One cadet who passed through Sandhurst in 1935 recorded that "Independent thinking is frowned on as heresy -no divergence from official view allowed."
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The Army Course at the LSE was not typical of the way in which Mackinder"s career has been characterised: "Most of the causes he worked for were betrayed or came to nothing, and most of his farsighted warnings went unheeded" 138 . It successfully tackled the unique problem that service education has to overcome: how to cover a number of diverse subjects in a relative short period of time so that they contribute to a single end. LSE) is not merely to acquire so much knowledge, but to obtain a mastery over methods. It is, therefore, obviously essential that practice should go along with precept, that you should work problems, that you should write essays, and that you should criticise verbally the material that is put in front of you. Only when you have heard the point of view of a master of the subject, and have then attempted to handle a problem yourself, are you in a position to discuss with advantage the difficulties which arise on a nearer approach to the subject" 139 .
The Mackindergarten in terms of its aims developed the critical link between the process of education, and the power of efficiency. It equipped officers with the ability to see the context of the situation the army had to operate in, and gave them the ability to meet its challenges by the simplest possible means. The Romans would have expressed this synthesis as "para bellum in pace" 140 It is as relevant today as when
Haldane instructed Mackinder to develop his "special ideas" in 1906.
What marked out the Mackindergarten, in terms of military education, was the ability to solve the "great synthetic problem". 141 The realisation that this approach, if based on a breadth of outlook, could bring a special kind of knowledge to bear The Army
Course between 1907 and 1914, and from 1924 to 1932 fulfilled these aims in a way that was unique. Yet it was not divorced from the challenges that education as a whole faces :"Knowledge is an honorific title we confer on our paradigm cognitive achievements, which is why there is an important question about the nature of knowledge. As an important honorific term,"knowledge" is bound to be contested….knowledge is not just a factual state or condition but a particular 
